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Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War 
has passed  through a number of stages, ranging from great 
activity in a variety of organizations and tasks  to what 
some call a return to the isolationist policies of the 
1930's.     Domestic considerations,   American pressure,  and 
the flux of international events all contributed to the 
formulation of this foreign policy.     This  thesis  outlines 
the broad picture of Canadian foreign relations between 
1949 and 1973,   and goes on to demonstrate  that Canada's 
policy toward the Chinese People's Republic was a reflection 
of the broader course of Canadian foreign relations. 
Canadian Governments,   and especially Liberal Governments, 
had for fewer reservations about recognizing or dealing with 
the Communist Chinese  than most Western nations,  but it was 
only when the domestic and international situations favored 
such action,   and American objections were minimal,   that the 
Canadians were able to act.     A variety of sources were con- 
sulted for this study, both here and in Canada.     The National 
Library and the  Library of Parliament in Ottawa contained the 
Parliamentary Debates.   the Prime Minister's  Pregs Releageg. 
a number of journals  that are otherwise difficult to locate 
in  the United States,   and a variety of Canadian newspapers. 
, 
As official documents for the period are not yet available, 
newspaper accounts,   and even more important,  analysis  and 
criticism in a number of Canadian magazines, were very signif- 
icant in developing this study.    Several book-length works, 
especially those  of Bruce Thordarson and Peter Dobell,   pro- 
vided insights  and details not found in other works.     It is 
hoped that this study will not only delineate Canadian foreign 
policy,   but demonstrate the complex situation that the smaller 
powers  face in formulating and executing their foreign policy. 
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I.     Introduction 
Canadians are fond of self-examination and  apparently 
derive great satisfaction from it,   readily dissecting any- 
thing Canadian,  whether  it be politics,   society,   literature 
and art,  or foreign policy.    While  other peoples  engage in 
this pastime,   Canadians  seem more consistent  and  thorough 
at it.     The reason for this may lie  in the fact that Canada 
is  a nation of diverse peoples and  opinions,   is stronger 
economically and more secure  than many nations  its  size,  yet 
is greatly influenced by the attitudes and policies  of its 
powerful southern neighbor.    Canadians have been,   and still 
are,  frank in their opinions about  their nation,   and the 
Government fosters  this  on-going debate  about anything Canadian 
by subsidising magazines,  such as  the Canadian forum,   and a 
variety of research organizations.     Thus  public debate about 
the great and small issues of the day is  a Canadian tradition, 
and  one  in which many Canadians participate. 
Though social problems  and domestic  policies  are fre- 
quently the center of debate,   another of  the more popular 
topics  for discussion is  foreign policy.     Canada is  in a 
unique position because  of its  size,  wealth and geographical 
location,   and ties  to the   old Empire-Commonwealth,   French- 
speaking nations,  and western Europe.    Whether  the  issue is 
the NATO alliance,  nuclear weapons  and NORAD,   aid  to developing 
countries,  economic  policy,   or the United Nations,   it is 
usually possible  to find at least two distinct opinions  on 
the  issue,  and occasionally more.    The  "interventionists," 
for example,  feel that Canada can aid in securing and main- 
taining world peace  and prosperity by pursuing an active 
or even aggressive  policy of foreign aid.  United  Nations 
peacekeeping activities,  and attempts  to influence American 
foreign policy.     The  "neutralists,"  on the  other hand,   feel 
that Canada can contribute  to world peace,  but lacks  the 
diplomatic  clout and economic resources  to pursue many of the 
policies  espoused by the interventionists.     The neutralists 
favor doing all that Canada can do within its means,  but 
not overextending itself or assuming an inflated idea of 
Canadian influence.     For some time in the  late 1960's  and 
early 1970*s many Canadians  railed against  the Merchant- 
Heeney doctrine  of  "quiet diplomacy," which stated that 
Canada should work diligently,  but unobtrusively,   to influence 
American policy in particular,  avoiding any sort  of con- 
frontation.1    Critics  objected that this was  simply another 
way of selling Canada short and simply another way of capit- 
ulating to American dictation.    Scholars  are now analyzing 
the foreign policy of the Trudeau years  to determine how and 
why this  Prime Minister's policy varies from  the policies of 
his predecessors.     Some critics and commentators argue that 
Trudeau has gone full circle  to the non-intervention policies 
of Mackenzie King in the 1930'a.2 
Domestic public  opinion certainly influences  the course 
and  operation of Canadian foreign policy,  but there  is an- 
other factor that influences Canadian actions as much as 
public  opinion.     The American presence is  a fact of life 
that most Canadians would rather  ignore,  but cannot,  even 
if that influence is diminishing.-'    The  origins  of American 
influence  are  fairly obviousi    geographical proximity,  the 
penetration of American capital into many areas  of the 
Canadian economy,  the  influence  of American culture,  even 
in French-speaking Canada.     All these create a situation 
that  Trudeau neatly described in his analogy of the elephant 
and  the mouse.     In the  1950's and  the early 1960's  this in- 
fluence was extremely pervasive  in Ottawa,   though not without 
its critics.     The Vietnam war and  other events of the late 
1960's  led  to a modest dimunition of the American role in 
Canadian foreign policy.     Critics,  rebelling against  "quiet 
diplomacy," called for an independent policy for Canada.     The 
energy and resources  shortages,  and a modest awakening to  the 
realities  of both American policy and aims,   and the short- 
comings  of supposed vehicles  of American imperialism,  such 
as multinational corporation,  have  oreated yet a more inde- 
pendent and Canadian policy,  whether it is a return to isolation 
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or not. 
Canadian policy toward China in many ways reflects the 
broader course  of Canadian foreign policy.     There have been 
differing opinions  about the course  of this policy,   the timing 
of certain actions,  and the reasons  for acting or failing to 
act.     From 19**9  to 1970 Canadian policy makers faced many 
difficulties  in implementing a policy even when domestic 
opinion was solidly behind them because  of American pressures. 
Recognition of the  Peoples'  Republic of China was  not an arm 
of American policy,   and this caused much hesitancy and no 
small amount of equivocation in Canada between 19^9  and 1968. 
The  idea of recognition of China was by no means  a new idea, 
but doing so required courage,   a sense  of timing,   and the 
proper circumstances.     For all the  American influence*  it 
should be  noted,  however,   that Canada never closed  the door 
on China.     Trade between the  two nations continued  on a 
very modest scale,   and  the grain sales of the  1960's  attracted 
much attention and criticism.    Washington might well set out 
guidelines,  but Ottawa was not a servant  of all that came  from 
her powerful neighbor. 
The source materials  for this study are many and varied, 
though some  of the most illuminating and descriptive  are still 
classified.     The debate  and commentary on the subject of 
Canadian-Chinese relations provides many insights  to complement 
the straight-forward narratives  of events.     Position papers, 
White  papers,   and statements by Cabinet Ministers  provide  the 
official version and interpretation of events,  while  the press 
and  the statements  of Members  of Parliament frequently provide 
colorful  or incisive commentary.     Thus while information and 
sources deemed valuable  to the historian are  lacking,   there 
is  no dearth  of material  to provide  an adequate basis  for 
research in this topic. 
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II.     The Middle Power 
By 19^5 Canadian diplomats and policy-makers were deeply 
involved,  with many others,   in creating the United Nations 
and in expressing hope  that this organization and cooperation 
among the nations would mark the origins of a new and peaceful 
world.     Canadians were proud of their contributions  to the 
war effort and rightly felt that they had had an important 
part in winning the war.     Though they realized that Canada 
was by no means so powerful as   the United States  or Russia 
or so influential as France or China,  they felt that Canada 
along with   other relatively small nations,   such as  Australia 
or the Scandinavian states,  had a particular role to play in 
world affairs.     The   "Middle Powers" should unite to see that 
the Great Powers did not dictate the state   of world affairs 
or create potentially dangerous  situations.     Canadian officials 
even devised a theory to fit their perception —  "the 
functional theory."    Though this term dropped out of usage 
within several years,   the idea of the Middle Power,   and its 
particular role,   influenced Canadian policy and action for 
twenty-five years. 
In the eyes  of Canadian leaders during and shortly after 
the Second World War.   one of the chief arenas for the Middle 
Power was the United Nations.     The hope  of influencing the 
Great Powers  led to a desire to implement the United Nations 
Charter.  There were problems to he sure, for Canada would 
have to be willing to make the necessary contributions if 
she were to have any influence. Louis St. Laurent, Mackenzie 
King's successor, felt that Canadians were willing to bear 
the burden. He statedi " ... whatever may be required is 
a price that Canada is prepared to pay to make the organization 
effective, if it can be made effective."  Thus Canadians, 
who had treated the League of Nations with reserve, plunged 
into the United Nations with high hopes.  Unfortunately a 
sense of disillusionment soon overtook many Canadians.  Despite 
all the talk about Middle Powers, the Creat Powers acted as 
they usually had done, ignoring the smaller countries and 
reserving the veto for the Security Counoil, which became 
their own preserve.  Canadians did not give up hope for the 
United Nations because of these early actions, but began to 
take a realistic view of the future course of the organization. 
The functional or Middle Power theory was not an iron- 
clad rule, however, and Canadian foreign policy, which had 
always been pragmatic, soon found realistic reasons to modify 
this theory.  Since Canada was a democratic nation with 
historic ties to Britain, the United States, and western Europe, 
Canadian participation in NATO seemed a logical and practical 
approach to security as the Cold War began.  An effective NATO 
would supplement the collective security to be provided by the 
United Nations.  The North Atlantic community had always been 
important to Canada for reasons of defense and economics, and 
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NATO was now a means  to strengthen older ties and thus meet 
a new situation* 
Both the United States and Canada had emerged from 
their isolationist policies of the 1930'I to face a grave 
threat in Europe.    For the first time in its history. Canadian 
troops were stationed abroad in peacetime, marking a new 
departure in the growth of Canadian foreign policy.    Meanwhile 
the Commonwealth provided an opportunity for participation 
in international affairs,  an opportunity that was not open 
to many other nations.    Canada had been the leader of the 
old Commonwealth,  and Canadians  assumed the leadership positions 
in the post-war Commonwealth that included African and Asian 
nations.     Beoause  of the presence of these new nations,   the 
Commonwealth appeared  to be a link between Asian and other 
countries  or a means  of sharing common interests and ideas. 
Canadians assisted these new nations  in a variety of ways, 
encouraging their efforts  to achieve  independence,  soliciting 
their membership in the councils  of the new Commonwealth and 
giving aid via the Colombo Plan to a number of developing 
states.     This Commonwealth experience enhanced Canada's status 
around  the world,  provided a link to the developing nations, 
and gave Canada's  friends information and perspective,   as well 
as  providing useful allies  in the United Nations.     In these 
early years  after the war the relationship was  often close, 
and  on one  occasion Dean Atcheson sarcastically referred to 
Canadian-Indian-British co-operation as the  " [Krishna]  Menon 
cabal."2 
Thus by the mid-1950's Canadian foreign policy and 
Canada itself had assumed the Middle Power position that 
gave the country importance in world affairs.     The concept 
of the Middle Power led to Canadian participation in the 
United Nations,  even though there were reservations about the 
ability of the  organization.     Canadian troops participated 
in the Korean War,   and the Canadian Government worked diligently 
through the U.N.   to solve the complicated problems  associated 
with Palestine  and Kashmir.     At the same time, Canadians were 
among the   leaders  in forming NATO.     Even in fostering the 
Commonwealth,  Canada acted as  a Middle Power.     Part of the 
definition of the Middle Power was   that it had the resources 
to aid less developed nations,   and  the responsibility to do 
so.     Mackenzie King's concept,  implemented by one  of the 
brightest and most aggressive Department of External Affairs' 
staffs in the bureau's history, had brought Canada perhaps 
to the apex of her influence  in world affairs. 
This high point was not reached without difficulty,  to 
be sure.     Obtaining full strength for the Canadian contribution 
to NATO placed a strain on the Canadian Army,  a strain that 
the Korean War made all the worse.     The Canadian Government 
had hesitated at first to participate in Korea,  but finding 
that public  opinion demanded some action.   Parliament voted 
to commit troops.     The Canadian Government was taken aback 
by the invitation to join the International Control Commission 
(ICC)  for Indo-China in 195^-     Canadians had only recently 
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become  accustomed to having troops in Europe and Korea.     This 
invitation meant that nore troops and more money would be re- 
quired.     Furtheri   the  task was complicated by the  lack  of 
U.N.  direction or supporti   the Commission itself laid plans, 
stationed and supplied observers  and formulated policy.     This 
meant using and supplying Canadian troops and detaching 
External Affairs  officers for the project.    There was,  however, 
an obligation,   and the Canadian Government with little support 
from other nations,  and few ideas about organizing for this 
type  of  operation,  assumed the task.J    This stretching of 
material and manpower became a problem  of grave  importance. 
There were  other problems as well.    Being a Middle Power meant 
playing off one party against another in a host of situations. 
Within NATO,   for example,  Canadians could not get too close 
to the French without offending the Americans  or the British 
or vice versa.     Working with Nehru and Krishna Menon was  bound 
to draw criticism from the  Americans,   and fostering Commonwealth 
activities might well be  considered anti-colonial by the French 
or Portugese Governments.    Much to the credit of the External 
Affairs  staff and the Government in general,  the  problems were 
overcome,  and Canada's  star shone brightly. 
The  zenith of the Canadian role as  the Middle Power came 
in 1956 with  the Canadian intervention in the Suez.     This  action, 
a great success  for Canada,  brought much praise.     At the  same 
time,   it marked  a significant turning point.     There were  to 
be many more Canadian peacekeeping missions,   and many other 
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successors,  but  there was  also to be a rising tide  of criticism, 
a questioning of the concept of the Middle Power,  and a change 
in circumstances  that worked to Canada's disadvantage.     The 
middle of the road, where Middle Powers theoretically travelled, 
became a difficult route to follow in the late 1950'a. 
The Suez  intervention was significant for Canada because 
of the  boldness   of the initiative and the success  of the 
opeartion.     The British, French, and Israelis had conspired 
in October 1956,  to attack Egypt, after Egypt had closed the 
Suez Canal.    The Israelis attacked first,  and then the British 
and the Prench stepped in,  ostensibly to protect the Canal. 
The pretext was  transparent at best,  and Canadians,  who as a 
rule had closely supported the British in all matters, were 
now incensed.     Though  they did not wish to see  the British 
dragged before  the U.N.  and censured,  they felt that some- 
thing should be done to rectify the situation.    While they 
sought to save British and French face, they also tried to 
mollify the Americans who called for condemnation of the two 
powers as aggressors.     The upshot of Lester Pearson's strenuous 
efforts was the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force, which 
was stationed between the Egyptians on the one hand,  and the 
British, French and Israelis on the other.    A truce was effected, 
though no permanent settlement was  achieved.     Pearson won a 
Nobel Prize  for his peacekeeping plan,  which had its  origins 
in the ICC  and became  an important part of Canadian foreign 
policy.4    The success  at Suez was sweet,  indeed.    Canada's 
stature  as  a world power rose,  and in the next ten years 
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Canadians were  to be involved in peacekeeping missions in 
Lebanon,   the Congo,  Yemen,  India,  and Pakistan,   and Cyprus. 
Canada became  the main line of communication between Britain 
and the United States,   and Canadians attempted to restore 
American-British relations at every turn.     Thus Canada did 
seem  on the verge  of an era of remarkable influence in world 
diplomacy. 
Beneath the glitter of success,  however, profound forces 
began to undermine  the Canadian position as  leader  of the 
Middle  Powers.     Pirst,  Suet marked the end of the  Canadian 
practice  of playing the  United States  off against  Britain, 
or playing the Commonwealth off against the United States.5 
Further,  the victory of  the Conservative Party in 1957 meant 
that some  of the  senior External Affairs  staff,  who were re- 
sponsible for the ideas  and successes  of Canadian policy, 
left their positions,   leaving new and unseasoned men in their 
places.    Most dramatic,  however,  was the change  in Canada's 
position relative  to other nations.     In the ten years  following 
the Second World War,  Canada had been the undisputed leader 
of the Middle  Powers.     By 1955.  nations such as France,  Germany, 
and Japan had begun their revival,   and  other emerging nations 
also took their places in world affairs.     This was  particularly 
evident in the United Nations,  where  an increased membership 
placed Canada in a large group of middle-sized,  economically 
strong and stable nations.     Though it was not dramatically 
apparent at the  time,   the  Commonwealth  too was  beginning to 
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crumble as an organization, again weakening the Canadian 
position. The rising price of military hardware coincided 
with the end of the Canadian postwar economic boom, so that 
further strain was placed on the ability of Canada to maintain 
its peacekeeping and NATO commitments.  Conservative foreign 
policy under the Diefenbaker Government from 1957 to 1963 did 
not differ appreciably in its aims from that of the Liberals, 
but for this complex set of reasons it was less successful, 
and was maintained at a greater price. 
To this point, American influences have been mentioned 
only incidentally, but it was American relations that also 
caused some rethinking of the Canadian role and the Canadian 
attitude. With Canada's rise as a potent international force, 
it had become clear that relations with the United States could 
no longer assume the easy course that they once had followed. 
Issues extended beyond the boundary disputes, canals and tariffs. 
While there were many goals, such as defense, in which there 
were common aims, there were many other areas, such as policy 
toward communist China, that were a source of sharp disagree- 
ment.  On the whole, between 19^5 and 1955. Canadians stood 
up for their beliefs, but acquiesced to the American point 
of view where no purpose was served by criticism or conflict. 
In the case of Suez, for instance, the Canadians resisted 
American pressure to condemn the British and French, but they 
tended to avoid the question of American policy regarding China. 
Ik 
The issue of the American relationship came to a head 
in 1957-58 with the debate about the acceptance of the North 
American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the subsequent con- 
troversy about accepting nuclear warheads.  The Liberals had 
all but completed negotiations for NORAD, and the Conservatives 
found themselves compelled to accept a f_aAi accompli in 1958. 
The Conservatives claimed that NORAD was an extension of NATO 
— which it was not — and thus added confusion to what was 
already an unclear treaty.  The Conservatives also committed 
Canada to accepting nuclear warheads, and this and NORAD 
quickly became volatile political issues.  Diefenbaker had 
been hesitant to accept the warheads for fear of a public 
outcry, which soon arose.  The Liberals strongly criticized 
the acceptance of the warheads.  Canada, the critics argued, 
was gradually easing itself out of its own defense policy by 
signing the NORAD agreement, leaving the DEW line to the 
Americans, and abandoning the Canadian-built Arrow for the 
American BOMARC.  Later events further compounded the Conservatives 
problems.  In 1963 Canadian military men revealed that they 
felt Canada was committed to accepting nuclear warheads and 
was not doing so.  Pearson and the Liberals reversed their 
position on the warheads, and the Conservatives found themselves 
in a debate they had never anticipated.  Badly divided, almost 
undone by the Americans, they lost the 1963 elections on this 
issue alone. 
It is difficult for Americans to realize the heat that 
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this dispute generated and the depths  to which it affected 
Canadians.    Diefenbaker had,   in effect, primed the nation 
for a debate such as this, with his anti-American attitude 
and his criticisms of American tariffs and American invest- 
ments in Canada.     Thoughtful Canadians now carried further 
a reexamination of their country's position,   a process already 
under way in the late  1950's and early 1960's.     One  of the 
first full-scale criticisms was James Minifie's book peacemaker 
ox Powder-Monkey.   in which he boldly suggested that Canada 
break its  ties with NORAD and NATO, cast off all concern for 
the American reaction to Canadian policy,   and make Canada the 
world's peacemaker,  not a servant to the world's warmakers. 
Minifie's moralistic approach had something to be said for itj 
many Canadians did believe that Canada's role as a Middle Power 
was to work for world peace,  and believed that close association 
with the United States only served to heighten the danger of 
war.     His critics were quick to point out that neither Canada 
nor the United States lived in a racuum,  and that while 
neutralism was  a commendable policy,   one could go too far in 
this direction,  weakening the western alliance in the face 
of Communist pressure.7    In the early 1960's  it appeared that 
those in favor of close association with the United States 
and NORAD held the upper hand,  and they produced well reasoned 
arguments in favor of such cooperation.     R.J.  Sutherland urged 
his fellow Canadians to stop torturing themselves with the 
thought that Canada was a U.S.  satellite.    All that was  "beside 
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the point" i    no nation was or could be independent.    The wisest 
policy was  to capitalize  on "our uniquely close relationship 
with the United States," and to use  this as a source  of strength 
in world affairs.      In such an atmosphere the Merchant-Heeney 
document was written. 
The years  of the Pearson Ministry (1963-1968)  were years 
of transition for Canada,  as Canadians became more  and more 
conscious  of changes in their world position.     Increasingly 
they realised that despite attempts to loosen the American 
connection,   there was  in fact no way to undo this  tie.    Canadian 
defense planning became bound to American policy,  and the  in- 
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dispensability of the United States  in NATO had to be accepted. 
As  the  American presence in Canadian affairs was examined and 
reexamined,   the first waves  of harsh anti-Americanism began 
to rise.     When Canadians spoke out in opposition to American 
policy,   they drew rebukes  from the United States government. 
In 1965,  for example, when Pearson in a Philadelphia speech 
criticised  the bombing of North Vietnam,  President Johnson 
promptly reminded him of his place. 
In the last years  of the Pearson Government a growing 
sentiment for change found expression in the press  and in a 
number of books examining Canadian foreign policy.     There was 
a variety of ideas,  policies, and options put forward in the 
late  I960's.     Critics suggested that Canada withdraw from 
NATO on the grounds  that continuing in that organisation 
only made Canada dependent upon the United States  and pre- 
cluded Canada from taking an active role in international 
affairs.10    At the same time John Holmes noted that Canada 
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was  no longer  "a fresh young force come  out of the  North," 
and  that new.  realistic policies must be  developed.     The 
concept of the  Middle Power,  he argued,  should be cast off 
and the idea that Canada could be a satellite should be  accepted, 
like  it or not,   if that were the reality of the situation. 
Escott Reid,   the former Deputy Under Secretary of the Department 
of External Affairs felt that Canada should reorient its aims 
in the 1960's and 1970'•• working to develop the Third World 
and to bring China into the mainstream of world affairs. 
Canada,  in his belief, could make important contributions in 
12 these  two areas  by prompt and vigorous actions. Others 
argued that Canadian peacekeeping activities should not be 
limited but should be extended,   since  they gave  an important 
role to the smaller nations.    Still others remarked and 
maintained that,   given the rise  of French-speaking Canada and 
the attention Quebec was  receiving,  Canada should put greater 
13 efforts  into aiding French-speaking nations. 
At the heart of all these suggestions was  the  idea that 
Canadian policy had become  too closely bound to American policy, 
and that Canada was.  economically and culturally losing its 
independence to  the United States.    Some  observers noted the 
contradiction that proximity to  the United States,  while giving 
security,   limited freedom of action.     Yet such  observers had 
no positive suggestions for a Canadian course  of action.1' 
Stern critics  of Canadian policy  (and society)  argued at length 
in favor of an "independent" policy for Canada.     They felt 
that Canada did have choices  in foreign policy areas,   and 
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should not quietly follow along in the wake of others — least 
of all the Americans.    These authors were more than simply 
uttering anti-American slogans.     They believed that,   in a 
democracy such as  Canada,   all the people  should be  informed 
and consulted about foreign policy.     This  idea,   though hardly 
novel,  had seldom found such an extended and consistent ex- 
position as  in Stephen Clarkson's book.  AJI Independent Foreign 
Policy for Canada?"    The  anti-American element thus combined 
with a positive sentiment in some groups to create a forward- 
looking,  if undefined, set of ideas for policy making. 
Between the 1963 and the 1968 elections much soul searching 
took place,  and the realities of the Canadian position ware 
recognized,   if no solutions to the problems were found.     The 
concept  of the Middle Power was recognised as  outmoded,  and 
some rationale for future conduct was sought.    Both anti- 
Americanism and domestic problems entered into this reappraisal. 
The times were by no aeans easy for Canadians,  at home or abroad, 
but the debate had been opened and the realities of the situation 
revealed.     The wide variety of options mentioned by various 
authors  certainly demonstrated that the nation could act in 
a number  of ways,   and what was really needed was some  ordering 
of Canadian foreign policy priorities. 
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III.     Canadian Foreign Policy Under Trudeau 
In the years between 19^5 and 1968 Canada had  followed 
a foreign policy that entailed adherence  to regional col- 
lective security organizations such as  NATO and NORAD, 
while working diligently in international arenas such as 
the U.N.    Collective  security and internationalism were 
key elements  of the St.   Laurent-Pearson tradition,  elements 
that even the  Conservatives  had to take into account in 
their actions.     However,  in the face  of rising costs,  di- 
minishing Canadian influence,  and increasing questioning of 
Canada's role  in world affairs,  a change in attitude  and 
policy did not seem far off by 1968.    Canadians were very 
much interested  in what was  being accomplished in foreign 
relations,   just as  they were  aware  of the problems they had 
to contend with.     It thus seemed quite logical that the new 
Prime Minister,   Pierre Elliott Trudeau,  should call for a 
review of the  aims  and practices  of Canadian diplomacy 
shortly after his election. 
However,  most Canadians had not expected such  "a 
thorough and comprehensive review"  as  Trudeau proposed in 
May 1968.1    He  stressed a "realistic" approach in line  with 
Canadian resources,  needs,   and desires,  and he indicated 
that Canada's  political  "survival and independence" were 
at stake.     He  also indicated  that he had already made 
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decisions  for some important changes — recognition of 
Communist China,   increased emphasis  on the nations of the 
Pacific,  greater contacts with Latin America,  and accelera- 
tion of international development assistance.     In this 
statement of May 29,   Trudeau clearly limited Canada's 
role in world affairs  to the pursuit of narrow though 
well-defined goals.     Referring to Canada as  "the largest of 
the small powers," he said it was of little use   "to pre- 
tend either to ourselves or to others  that we can do things 
clearly beyond our national capacity." 
The motives for Trudeau's review have been the sub- 
ject of much debate.     Bruce Tbordarson in Trudeau, flM 
Foreign Policy argues  that the impetus came from Trudeau's 
inclination rather than from internal or even external 
pressures.     Trudeau,  according to Thordarson,  felt that 
the new Prime Minister should not simply take over Pearson's 
foreign policy;  second,   that it was part of his   "image" to 
change and to be  open to new ideas;   third,   that the Cabinet 
wished to broaden the number of persons involved in making 
foreign policy decisions;   and, fourth,   that Trudeau wished 
to implement policies  that reflected his view of the world.2 
Thordarson's emphasis upon the personal motives of the 
Prime Minister and consideration for the influence  of the 
Cabinet Ministers seems valid.    Thordarson does mention 
public  opinion and internal and external pressures,   but 
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relegates  them to a much less important role.    However, 
the changes in Canada's position in world affairs was very 
striking and becoming increasingly obvious in the late 
1960's.     In 19^5 Canada was  one  of the four or five greatest 
military powers  in the world and was in much better physical 
and financial shape than Britain, France,  Germany,   Japan, 
and a great many other powers.     By 1968 her influence had 
diminished considerably,  while costs in both dollars and 
in manpower had risen.     Trudeau certainly realized this. 
Even if public opinion polls showed little change  among 
the people's attitudes in the 1960's,   there was growing 
criticism that would sooner or later lead to changes in 
public  opinion.     Works such as Kari Levitt's SiifiDl 
Surrender  (1970),  Clarkson's An Independent foreign EflilflV. 
f0r Canada?  (1968), Hertzman's Alliance and. IllMJOM   (1969). 
and later works  such as Redekop's ThS. 9taT-§Par«led MaXfiX 
(1971)   took  the course  of Canadian foreign policy to task, 
especially with regard to the American relationship.     These 
and still other works claimed that Canadian foreign policy 
was not in line with Canadian abilities and aspirations, 
or the Canadian position in the late 1960's.     Trudeau is a 
thoughtful and perceptive man, very much in tune with both 
public sentiment and intellectual argument.     The decision 
to review and change foreign policy may very well have been 
his decision,   as  Thordarson suggests,  but this review and 
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and change in all probability included much more thought 
about Canada's position and public  opinion than Thordarson 
concedes.     In effect calling for a change in 1968 enabled 
Trudeau to steal a march on his critics, present and potential. 
In his  1968 list of priorities Trudeau placed national 
unity and the continuation of a free and independent Canada 
at the top,  and moved peacekeeping and collective security 
to the bottom,   and he did so for very logical and realistic 
reasons.     Trudeau was very much concerned about Canad's 
future in light of the violent French-Canadian demands for 
sovereignty and the  growth of regular political organisations 
espousing French-Canadian independence.     There was little 
to be gained in Trudeau's view by being the world's peace- 
keeper and guardian if everything fell apart at home.     At 
the same time Trudeau did not believe that Canada was in 
danger from a war between Russia and the United States 1 
hence he thought resources allocated to collective security 
organizations could be freed for use in more important 
areas, especially at home.     By concentrating Canadian 
foreign policy in smaller, more selective,  areas where 
certain widely accepted goals could be achieved,  the Prime 
Minister hoped to draw Canadians together and create a more 
unified and nationally-oriented country.     This domestic, 
even political,  consideration was also one of the most 
important in the decision to review and alter foreign 
policy. 
Not long after the 1968 statement. Canadians began to 
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see new policies in effect,  even while the review was only 
beginning.     In 1969,   Trudeau much to the consternation of 
his  NATO allies,  decided to limit Canadian participation 
in that organization.     This decision was made under pressure, 
as the Canadian budget was under consideration and NATO 
itself had requested statements from members about their 
projected participation in the organization.     The decision 
to curtail participation was a logical one given Trudeau's 
aims and priorities.     The Prime Minister solicited  the 
opinions  of the public,   the academic community,  Parliament, 
and his  advisers before  announcing the cuts in troop strength 
in Europe.     Though Europeans and Americans were at first 
alarmed,   the Canadian withdrawal of troops was not as sub- 
stantial as  feared,   and the Canadian staff worked closely 
with NATO officials in planning and executing the cut-backs. 
Both friends  and critics  of the decision believed that the 
Prime Minister had already decided upon this course  of 
action,   and that the only real decision was how far  to cut 
Canadian participation.     In their opinion events had only 
served to force  the issue,  which would have come to a head 
sooner or later. 
Many Canadians applauded the move,   seeing it as an 
important precedent in Canadian policy.     It served Canada 
well by reducing committments,  cutting expenses,  and above 
all serving notice that Canada was  to pursue a more  thoughtful 
and  Canadian  policy in  the  future.     Critics,   however,   were 
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greatly alarmed at this action, seeing in it the first stages 
of a return to isolationism.    The purpose of the  announcement 
was in part to indicate to Canadians that new approaches to 
old problems were to be considered and adopted,  but this 
information only heightened fears that there would be   other 
withdrawals and dramatic changes in Canadian policy.     Peyton 
Lyon observed« 
We are retreating from Europe, failing to in- 
crease our activity in other areas or organizations 
to any significant degree and taking a giant step 
in the direction of continental isolationism.     If 
not quite a free ride  in world affairs, we are 
taking one that will be much cheaper,   and more 
sharply focussed on national interests.5 
Though this change in the NATO commitment was only one 
action,  and what proved to be a limited one at that,  it 
was  a sign of the changes the Liberals and Trudeau wished 
to make. 
In 1968 Trudeau had hoped to produce a "white paper" 
evaluating foreign policy and projecting a course of action. 
The process became more involved,   though,  as  parliamentary 
committees,   party conferences,  the press,  and intellectuals 
all  joined wholeheartedly in scrutinizing Canadian diplomacy. 
The  task was by no means an easy one;   assembling the material 
and preparing a statement dragged on for some time.     The 
Opposition was able to keep the issue alive in Parliament 
by continual questioning about the appearance of the report, 
a strategy that also served to give the impression that the 
nation was without a policy during this time.     What finally 
appeared in late June 1970.  was a set of six booklets with 
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with  the  title Foreign Policy £or. Canadians.     The first 
booklet provided the reasons for undertaking this analysis 
and   the criteria for choosing a policy, noted the difficulty 
of making such choices and the problems the world faced in 
the   1970's,  and finally outlined the policies that Canada 
would follow in the coming    decade.     The other five pamphlets, 
or section papers, dealt with policy matters in a particular 
area.     Europe,   Latin America, and the Pacific were the three 
areas  of greatest emphasis while the United Nations  and 
development assistance were discussed in two other papers. 
The publication of these papers removed the pressure from 
the Government,   and provided the long-awaited statement of 
Canadian aims. 
Each of the pamphlets is a clear and succinct statement 
of aims and the rationale for pursuing a stated policy.     The 
booklet dealing with Europe states that Europe is a good counter- 
weight to the United States, which was hardly a new idea.     The 
Canadian policy was to increase ties to Europe,   especially 
France,   in order to strengthen Canada.     In the area of Latin 
American relations, ways in which Canada could become more 
closely involved with these  nations were stressed.    Membership 
in the   Organization of American States was not recommended, 
at least until Canada had developed independent policies with 
these  nations, so that American influence in the  OAS would 
not limit Canadian freedom of action.     The United Nations 
pamphlet stressed the necessity for new activities for Canada 
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within the United Nations organization, Canada to have less 
of a political role, while playing a bigger part in economic 
development, international law and human rights. The paper 
on international development called for increased financial 
assistance with less aid restricted to Canadian purchases, 
and more assistance from the private sector.  The Pacific 
policy booklet, which will be discussed in detail later as 
it pertained to China, urged the strengthening of economic 
connections with Japan, China, and other Pacific nations. 
The reaction to the foreign policy papers was mixed, 
to say the least. Supporters of the Trudeau foreign policy 
were quite satisfied with the statements and found them a 
useful source for discussing policy or citing the reason for 
this or that action.  They felt that the papers were realistic 
and rational, stressing the financial aspect of Canada's inter- 
national relations.  A number of editorial writers noted that 
under the new policy Canada was no longer committed to peace- 
keeping or to pretending to be neutral, a policy and a pretence 
that disturbed them.6 Dobell also saw virtue in the papers, 
noting that they gave Canadians "a transcendent goal" and 
averring that there was no risk "of a retreat into isolationism. 
... because Canada needs to express its separate identity through 
international action."7 However, a great number of people 
found the papers a source of concern for a variety of reasons. 
The first, and most general criticism was simply to say "so 
what?" After so much preparation and fanfare, the booklets 
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offered little  that most observers had not already seen put 
into effect between 1968 and  1970.     The general review 
proved little more than a summary of the policies the 
Trudeau Government had implemented,   and in fact reflected or 
expanded on Trudeau's 1968 statement.    Further, some felt 
the review touched all points  of the compass,  but failed 
to come  to any hard and fast conclusions about the courses 
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of action that ought to be pursued.       A second and more pene- 
trating criticism was  that by far the most important aspect 
of Canadian external relations was entirely omitted in 
the  booklets  — the United States was hardly mentioned.     This 
represented  a great omission in the eyes of many,  particularly 
in light  of the continuing anti-American sentiment stirred 
by criticism  of American investment and by the Vietnam War. 
Failure  to treat this important topic  was seen by some  as 
quiet acquiescence  to the  larger aims  of American policy, 
particularly in view of the fact that the Canadians'   economy 
Q 
was tied to and dependent upon the American economy.' 
A number of vociferous critics found what they deemed 
deep philosophic problems in the Trudeau policy.  The book- 
lets all stress economic growth as a cardinal point in Canadian 
policy, a notion that had its place, but in the eyes of some 
critics, not as one of the main concerns of Canadian external 
relations.  The Toronto filfib_e. aM MlU editorialized that 
"whether talking about Eastern Europe, Latin America, the 
Pacific, or Western Europe the report usually is concentrating 
upon one pointi  dollars and cents." Further, in the estimation 
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of the Globe.  the entire policy "tipped the scale toward 
the dollar and away from diplomacy."10    These were mild 
words  in the  light of Jack Granatstein's scathing remarks i 
The world is  our oyster,  and these are opportunities 
too good to be missed in the Pacific states  and in 
Latin America.     The smell is that of long green,  the 
message  that of the  open door and the idealism that 
of the beckoning market mentality. 
Granatstein concluded his reviews 
The only message that comes through loud and clear 
is money for businessmen, profits, and dollars in- 
vested abroad.     Preserve  and extend the status quo.*1 
Remarks  such as  these indicated that by placing economic 
concerns  at the head  of the new list of priorities,  and 
moving peacekeeping and world security to a lower position, 
the Government left itself open to the charge  of being 
mercenary and Philistine,  as well as  of abandoning the 
important goals  that permitted economic  growth.    Though the 
Minister  of External Affairs  later denied that the Government 
had abandoned other goals for economic  aims,   the damage had 
been done,   and the critics rightly maintained that  the  idea 
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of dollar-diplomacy might well damage Canada's image abroad. 
To many critics,   Trudeau's policies  also appeared to 
be movements  toward isolation or toward an unduly modest or 
overly realistic  assessment of Canadian influence  on world 
affairs.     Peyton Lyon's remarks  about NATO applied to all 
phases  of the new statement of Canadian aims,  while  Jack 
Granatstein labelled the policy review "no ringing manifesto" 
but described it as  "modest and careful,  cautious  and imprecise, 
and so,   so Canadian."13    In a more extensive review Granatstein 
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compared  Trudeau's  policies  to those  of Mackenzie King, 
declaring that  "our policy now is as  isolationist as  ever 
it was in the  1930's," and noting that the  only difference 
was   that  "Washington [hadj  replaced London as  the source 
of information and world view."        Of some viewed the new 
policies  as  isolationist or understating the Canadian potential, 
at  least  one critic,  Claude Ryan of L^ Devoir remarked that 
they lacked idealism or altruism that had characterited previous 
Canadian policy.     He caustically commentedi 
Les  planifioateurs federaux ont voulu se  liberer du 
complexe de   "boy scout" qui caracterisa naguere  la 
politique etrangere du Canada.   /Le  "realisme" qu'ils 
ont substitue' a l'ancien aux preoccupations des 
hommes de ce  temps.15 
There was  in these policy statements an apparent rejection 
of the role Canada had played and the success in this  role 
that Canada had had  after the war that deeply concerned these 
men.     Though Trudeau and his advisers did not intend to dis- 
pense with these  activities,  it certainly appeared that way. 
There was  very little means  by which the Pearson tradition 
could be rejected outright,  even if such were intended,  but 
this  thought did not stop the critics. 
It is  difficult  to anaylze the Trudeau foreign policy 
because  it  is still very much with us.     It certainly was a 
new policy,   and for whatever reasons,  Trudeau intended it to 
be  that way.     The emphasis upon Canada,   and a policy that 
would better serve Canadian goals was necessary in the  late 
1960's  and  the early 1970's.    Faced with great difficulties 
at home,   the Government understandably tried to curtail 
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foreign ventures and limit Canadian activities to those 
with popular support.     The 1968 statement and the policy 
review were  attempts to head off criticism, reorient Canadian 
policy,  and coherently state Canadian priorities.     Though he 
did meet these two goals,   Trudeau was unable to quiet his 
critics.    He  laid out his priorities,  but omitted a statement 
on American relations,   a topic of great concern to many,  and 
in the eyes  of many surrendered Canadian idealism in foreign 
affairs for dollar-diplomacy.    A modest policy with modest 
aims stirred anger in others.    However,  in the long run 
Trudeau correctly assessed the situation or acted to create 
the situation he desired.     In the past several years foreign 
policy has not been a great issue in Canada.     American relations 
have always been a topic for discussion, but the general aims 
and actions  of Canadian foreign policy seldom appear in the 
spotlight.     One cause is that domestic concerns, such as un- 
employment,  energy,  and inflation have become the great problems 
that need solving.     There is another cause though,   and  that 
is  the fact that Trudeau defused foreign policy as a source 
of  discontent.     In a fashion, Trudeau made Canadian foreign 
policy so bland,  so low-key and unexciting,   that people did 
not become interested.     This,  indeed, may be grounds for 
criticism,  but Trudeau's attitudes toward foreign policy do 
seem to be the   ones best suited for the  times. 
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IV.     China Policy in the 1950's and Early 1960's 
Canada's policy toward China reflects many of the problems 
and Frustrations of Canadian foreign policy in general.     The 
desire  to carry out an independent, peaceful program that 
would  foster economic development and world order was 
constantly balanced by the need for defense and the participation 
in military alliances  that the Cold War produced.     Further, 
there was  always  the American influence upon the conduct of 
Canadian affairs,   an influence that was  especially strong in 
the case  of the Communist Chinese.     American policy until 
very recently disdained recognition of the Chinese People's 
Republic   (CPR),   and the Americans energetically attempted 
to prevent others from doing so.     Though Canadians in general 
wished to recognize Communist China from 19^9 on,   the flow 
of international events,   domestic considerations,   and American 
pressure were all factors,   bearing different values at different 
times,   that Canadian policy makers had to consider. 
When the  Nationalist Chinese fled to Taiwan in 19^+9, 
most Canadian officials   assumed that Canada would recognize 
the Communist Government created by Mao Tse Tung within a 
relatively short time.     Canadians had not been heavily engaged 
in the Pacific war or in China,   and had no attachment to the 
Nationalist regime.     When the  Nationalists  left Peking,   the 
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Canadian ambassador remained there until Pebruary 1951,  and 
a Canadian consulate remained in Shanghai until late 1951.l 
The Communists had invited Canada and a number of other 
nations to recognise their Government on October 1,  19^9. 
and India for one had promptly done so.    The Canadian 
Government was somewhat disturbed by the Chinese refusal to 
recognize  Great Britain in early 1950,  and had some  issues. 
such as the treatment of Canadian missionaries and the 
nationalisation of some business firms, to work out before 
recognition could be granted.    However, it appears that 
thinking on these issues was taking place in Ottawa in 1950, 
even if there was no action, and recognition was by no means 
impossible.2    An article in the April 1950 issue of the 
Canadian Forum explored in some detail the reasons for rec- 
ognizing Mao's Government.    Pirst,  Canada ought to seize the 
lead rather than to wait for the Americans, because prompt 
action might well ease the Chinese away from the Russian in- 
fluence,  precluding a feared combination of those two Communist 
giants.    Further,   it was  foolish to think that  "the undiluted 
Western democratic  or American way of life" was to be   the 
"universal  pattern"  for Asia,  China,   or other Asian nations. 
Some compromise  and flexibility would enable Canadians  to take 
the  initiative and perhaps disarm or at least placate  a 
potentially dangerous enemy.3    The  outbreak of the Korean War, 
however,  took Ottawa by surprise and dampened all hope  for 
immediate Canadian recognition of the  Communist Government. 
The Canadian Government's desire  to recognize the CPR 
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did not diminish with the coming the Korean War, hut the 
situation in which Ottawa found itself precluded any friendly 
action.     The  Government did feel that the Chinese,  though 
not aggressors, were certainly aiding the North Koreans, and 
for this reason felt compelled to send troops to the United 
Nations forces, thus placing them in   conflict with the 
Chinese.    While contributing to the United Nations effort, 
the Canadians did refrain from overt propaganda against the 
Chinese,  and resisted attempts to broaden the war in Asia, 
feeling that sooner or later China must be dealt with.    Despite 
the war,  there was a strong sentiment in Canada that a policy 
of military containment in Asia was impossible, and that only 
be recognizing the situation in Asia and understanding the 
problems to be faced, could any solution be achieved.      This 
is not to say that all Canadians favored a rapprochement with 
the Communist Chinese.    Letter writing campaigns criticising 
the CPR were organised by various groups, notably the Catholic 
Church,  and the Conservative Party denounced any suggestion 
by St.  Laurent  or Pearson that Canada should have  any dealings 
with the Communists.     One Conservative M.P.,  for example,  con- 
cluded  an emotional speech in Parliament by asking how the 
Canadian Government could deal with a government whose hands 
were "still red with the blood of Canadians."5    Pearson and 
St.   Laurent thus  found it to their advantage to keep the  issue 
out of the public arena,  despite their strong feelings  about it. 
The Canadian Government kept in contact with the Peking 
37 
Government,  and negotiated directly with it about aspects 
of the truce settlement and the return of Canadian prisoners 
or war.    Though Canadian policy displayed an independence and 
directness at this point, there were additional complications 
that created an uncertain air in the official Canadian 
attitude and prevented further progress or action.    Pearson 
later admitted that,  throughout the Korean War, American 
pressure had been significant,  and that Australia and  New 
Zealand  also had discouraged the Canadians from becoming 
friendly or making overtures to the Chinese.      At the same 
time the Canadian Government had to develop a positive policy 
that would take  into account the Nationalist Chinese,   the 
problem of United Nations seating for the Communists,   and a 
realistic  appraisal  of Communist motives  and actions.     Under 
the weight of these considerations,  and some domestic criticism, 
the St.   Laurent Government took no action to recognize  the 
Chinese  or promote  better relations for some  time — from the 
end  of the Korean War to the Conservative electoral victory 
in 1957. 
By 1957,  however,   the China issue had come  into its  own 
again as  an important topic for a variety of reasons,  not 
the  least  of which were economic.    John Harbron,  a Canadian 
commentator,   observed in the forum that trading across 
ideological barriers was neither new nor unprofitable,  especially 
in the case  of trade  with China, where strategic  or restricted 
items were  not    at all involved.    Further,  Harbron suggested 
that Canadian trade with China might well lead  to improved 
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United States-China relations.'    The decision to begin the 
grain trade with the Communist Chinese caused some division 
within the Conservative Ministry,  but the need to sell large 
quantities  of surplus wheat and fertilizer overrode any such 
complications.     This policy placed the Conservatives  in the 
peculiar position of doing an about face  on their former 
disclaimers  about the Communists,   as well as  leaving them 
Q 
open for some humorous and telling criticism in Parliament. 
The sales  proved not only profitable in the economic  sphere, 
going from $4 million in 1959 to $136 million in 1964, but 
also politically profitable,  as  the grain sales  are credited 
with saving the Prairie Provinces  for the Conservatives even 
in their losing efforts in 1963.     Critics might well claim 
that China was not using the wheat for the mass  of her people, 
but  only for select groups,^ but these economic  and political 
advantages  insured,  at least in part,  that relations with the 
CPR would be continued. 
Under the Conservatives thought was given to recognising 
Communist China,  but no action was  taken.    Howard Green,  the 
Conservative Secretary of External Affairs had epitomized the 
Middle  Power syndrome  in an article in i960,  stating that Canada 
had  to  take  the  independent approach to problems,  to be the 
-honest broker," and to act in an  "idealistic,  unselfish fashion.' 
However,  Mr.  Green also stated in a speech in Vancouver that the 
Government did not intend to establish any diplomatic relations 
with Communist China at that time,   a policy one  French-Canadian 
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11 columnist applauded loudly.**    The Quemoy and Matsu incident 
as well as the Chinese ventures into Tibet and India, did 
little  to gain sympathy for recognizing China,   and in fact 
provided much ammunition for those opposing such recognition. 
One M.P.   pointed out that Canadian recognition of the CPR 
would be   "discouraging LtoJ other nations, especially those 
of southeast Asia," while another pointed out that the 
Chinese Communist Government was a "ruthless aggressive 
12 government" that attacked even its friend. 
During the Conservative rule there were thoughtful 
critics who saw the Canadian dilemma and paved the way for 
the Pearson Government's  attempt to resolve the complexities 
of the China situation with the  "two China" policy.     In 1958 
one observer had commented that the China problem was most 
difficult for the Canadian Government because of the difficult 
situation itself and the great pressures that it created.    He 
noted that though Canada wished to pursue an independent course 
that was fair to all concerned, American pressure in particular 
13 
forced Canada away from her desired course of action. At 
the same  time the realization came that Taiwan was going to 
prove to be  the biggest stumbling block to any recognition 
of the Communists,   and might well be as big a problem as 
American -pressure.     In 1959 Chou En-Lai had declared that 
Taiwan was  a part of Chinese territory,  and that the Communist 
Government would not recognize any attempt to create two 
Chinas.     This pronouncement did not go unnoticed in Ottawa. 
14 
The Canadian position was an easy-going and accommodating 
one with respect to the CPR and the Nationalists.  Most 
Canadian Government officials at one time or another realised 
that the CPR was the viable government of a great number of 
Chinese, and one that ought to be recognized and brought 
into the world community.  On the other hand the Nationalists 
had created a viable government as wellt and it was against 
Canadian nature to declare that Taiwan should simply be turned 
over to the Communists.  The Canadians had no liking for 
Chiang Kai Shek, as he had misused Canadian assistance during 
the war, and had generally done little to ingratiate himself 
or his Government to the Canadian public.  Though the Nationalists 
established an embassy in Ottawa, the Canadian Government did 
not reciprocate.  Canadians tended not so much to be concerned 
for his Government, but rather for his people.  For this reason 
Canadians wished to find some means of self-determination for 
Taiwanese rather than to make a judgement about them one way 
or another.  Thus the hard line established by the CPR caused 
difficulties for the Department of External Affairs. 
There were ramifications of the China policy that com- 
plicated the Canadian dilemma. Recognition and support of 
the Taiwan Government would clearly aggravate the Communists 
and create a more difficult situation for Canada.  On the other 
hand recognition of the CPR would entail declaring Taiwan a 
part of the CPR. and thus antagonize the Americans as well as 
breaking with past Canadian policy on the subject.  There was 
no easy solution to this.  To break with the United States on 
in 
this matter,   and then be snubbed by the Chinese would only 
make Canada look foolish, while it would be equally foolish 
for Canada to declare that Taiwan did belong to the CPR.     Both 
Pearson and Diefenbaker brought the subject of recognizing 
China up in different conversations with President Eisenhower, 
and apparently both were roundly criticized for suggesting 
any compromise on the issue.     The United States made it clear 
that it was committed to supporting Chiang Kai Shek,  and would 
not tolerate  any differing opinions.   '    In order to seek some 
accommodation Canadian policy makers began to formulate a new 
Canadian approach that would hopefully circumvent the impossible 
situation they faced in the early 1960's. 
The new Canadian policy was an ingenious attempt to 
recognize the positions of all parties involved.     In 1964 the 
French had granted recognition to the CPR without breaking 
relations with Taiwan,   as mentioned earlier.     Though the 
Nationalists broke with the French shortly thereafter this 
bold attempt to overlook the complexities of the situation 
gave  the External Affairs thinkers of the new Pearson Government 
the idea for their "One China,   One Formosa Solution."    The 
Canadian policy was not intended to be applied in the entire 
international relations system,   but rather was focussed at 
first only on a United Nations solution.     Paul Martin,   the 
Secretary for External Affairs,   first made the proposal in 
a speech in the United Nations in which his aim was  only to 
set forth a means to seat the Communist Chinese in that or- 
ganization.     To this end Martin suggested that the Communists 
take a seat on the Security Council and in the General 
Assembly, while the Nationalists would occupy a seat in 
the Assembly as well.    This recognized the realities of the 
situation without treading on the rights  of either nation. 
It further served notice  that Canada intended to take action 
to bring the CPR into the world community.    Martin's proposal 
made no headway,   in part because no one placed the idea that 
he had suggested in the  form of a motion for the United Nations 
delegates  to consider.     Consequently the  organization took 
no action,  and in fact it appeared  that few nations wished 
to bring the matter up for discussion.     Pearson and Martin 
were quite well aware of the difficulties they faced,   especially 
in light  of the CPR attitude toward Taiwan, but they persisted 
in their pursuit of this policy because they felt it would 
"begin a process of breaking the log jam which has  faced the 
United Nations  assembly for many years."    Further,   they fully 
realized that their proposal was  "not an attempt to create 
two Chinas," but rather wasi 
an attempt to outline what might be a reasonable interim 
solution to the problem of Chinese representation, 
strictly limited to  the united  Nations context with no 
"SlicatioS in respect of the questions  of sovereignty 
or territorial rights   . ...10 
The  Pearson proposal  for the United Nations coincided 
with a growing interest trading with  the CPR.     For example. 
in the spring of 1964, Hfitfffl tt*   the international trade 
journal published by the Department of Trade and Commerce. 
published several articles   on trading with Communist China. 
*3 
These  articles,   and in particular the one by R.K.   Thompson, 
the Senior Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong,  gave detailed 
information about how to approach the Chinese, what types 
of goods were in greatest demand,  and how to arrange for con- 
tacts  and payments.     Nowhere  in any of the articles was there 
the slightest hint that such trade with the Chinese was im- 
17 proper,   or even had a limited future. At the same time public 
opinion came to favor recognitionof the CPR,   and even more 
strongly to favor improving trade relations,   a phenomena that 
18 crossed party lines as well. A 1966 Parliamentary debate 
on wheat sales  to China demonstrated that the question before 
most NI.P.s was not whether or not to sell wheat in quantity 
to the Chinese,   but rather how to expand the range  of goods 
being sold to them,  so that a greater sector of the Canadian 
19 economy might profit from the exchange. 
The Canadian Government began to feel some latitude in 
its approach  toward the Communists in 1966.     The  "One China, 
One Formosa Solution" failed to materialize  in the United 
Nations,   but American pressure relaxed.     Indeed,  it relaxed 
to the point that Pearson stated in a New York interview that 
Canada would recognize the CPR,  even if it were not seated 
in the United Nations.20     The opportunity did not present 
itself,   however.     The Great Cultural Revolution threw China 
into turmoil,   leading to uncertainty and hesitation in 
Ottawa,   and a withdrawal of Chinese interest in the possibilities. 
Thus Canada sought the recognition of Communist China 
I* 
from 1950 on.     The policy was not popular with the United 
States,   and at the time not even with the Canadian people. 
The Canadian Government did what it could to maintain con- 
tact with the  Communists,  and was successful in this respect. 
Events simply did not work in favor of giving formal recognition 
to the Peking Government, but the growth of trade relations 
demonstrated Canadian interest in the CPR.     The  "One China, 
One Formosa Solution" was an attempt to introduce the CPR 
into the  United Nations,   as a first step toward a wider 
recognition.     Canadian policy makers wished to see the CPR 
recognized,   but at the same time be fair to the Nationalists. 
Taking these factors,   and others into account it is not dif- 
ficult to see why the Canadians made little progress toward 
their goal. 
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V.     Trudeau and China,   1968 to the Present 
The election of Trudeau in 1968 marked the  juncture 
of a number of positive factors with resepct to Canadian 
relations with Communist China.     First,  Trudeau had a long 
interest in the CPR.     Though not an old China hand,  he had, 
in his travels,  visited the nation and written an account of 
his experiences there and the thoughts that the  trip had 
evoked.1     During his election campaign he had spoken fre- 
quently of diversifying Canadian foreign relations,  expanding 
Canadian interests   in the Pacific and specifically of 
recognizing Communist China with the understanding that 
Canada would not break relations with Taiwan.    Thus Trudeau's 
interest in China and his pledge to make some arrangement 
with the CPR were an important part of his policy to widen 
the horizons of Canadian foreign policy.     After his election 
he clearly stated his intention to pursue this policy of 
recognition in the near future. 
Public   opinion within Canada,  perhaps impressed by the 
value   of   the trade with the CPR,  also favored recognition, 
as did many editorial writers.    The major political parties 
including the Conservatives,   agreed that Communist China 
should be recognized,  and most put such a statement into 
their platform or made public  statements to that effect during 
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the  1968 election.     Though all made concessions for Taiwan, 
the general thrust was toward recognition of the CPR.    The 
intellectual atmosphere had been prepared for such a move 
as well.     Foreign policy observers and analysts had favored 
such action,   and articles such as Escott Reid's "Canadian 
Policy in China," strongly urged that the Canadian Government 
do as much as  it could to promote the recognition of the 
Peking Government for the good of all the nations of the 
,,  2 world. 
The international situation had also changed by late 
1968 and early 1969.     The CPR had overcome its internal 
problems,   and was again interested in world affairs.     At the 
same  time  the United Nations again renewed its interest in 
the Communists,   and proposals such as the Albanian Resolution 
for seating the Communists and ousting the Nationalists were 
drawing more attention and support.     It was increasingly ob- 
vious that it would be difficult to ignore a nation of the 
size  and importance  and population of China, despite American 
pressure to keep China out of the United Nations.     After four 
years  of analysis, many nations had also noted that even though 
the French had broken with Taiwan,   there had been no grave 
consequences   or repercussions for either party,  proving that 
such an action could be taken without emminent disaster.    The 
last factor,   one  of some significance, was that the U.S. 
President was talking in terms  of detente, and of opening 
relations with China,  while vowing to end the American pressure 
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in Vietnam.     In this  atmosphere  the situation looked to be 
a most auspicious  one  for a Canadian initiative. 
After Trudeau's statement of May 29,   1968,  there was 
however,   little  action on this  issue for another eight or 
nine months,   leading some  to believe that the Prime Minister 
had not been completely serious in his statement.    Three 
months  after the May pronouncement on foreign policy,  one 
critic  observed  that Trudeau's  statement amounted to an 
offer that  the Communists would never accept,  leading to 
speculation that  the  Prime Minister was  only going through 
the motions with  the CPR in order to satisfy the  "well-meaning 
left wing," while  saving Canada  "the  trouble of diplomatic 
relations  with Communist China at a time when relations would 
be  of limited advantage to both sides."3    Such views were 
dismissed when representatives  of the CPR and the Canadian 
Government met in Stockholm in February of 1969 to discuss 
means  of opening formal diplomatic relations between the two 
nations.     The Department of External Affairs  apparently was 
given much  latitude  in conducting the talks,  the  only 
directives  from the Cabinet being to support the Chinese 
bid for representation in the United Nations,  and not to 
state  that Taiwan belonged to the  Communists.       With limited 
and well-defined  aims  the Canadians were in a good position 
and hoped to make  progress without  too much difficulty. 
The Chinese,  however,  were suspicious  of the Canadian 
motives,  fearing that this might be some sort of ploy backed 
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by the Americans to embarass  them, or lead to the adoption 
of some form of two-China recognition.     The Chinese had 
three demands i    recognition of their regime as the legal 
government of Chinai   support of their claim for a United 
Nations seatj   and the acceptance of their claim to Taiwan. 
The Canadians readily agreed to the first two items, but 
balked at the  third.     The talks  began a lengthy period of no 
progress whatsoever.     The Chinese tried alternately cajoling 
and threatening,  but to no avail.    On the other hand Canadian 
representatives attempted to formulate some sort of statement 
that would suit the Chinese without completely selling out 
the Canadian position on Taiwan.     The talks recessed from 
time to time,   and often showed little hope of success.5 
Events in other areas moved swiftly, however, and there was 
criticism that Canada was wasting time and money on these talks, 
while the threat of being embarassed by the United Nations 
passage of the Albanian Resolution grew almost daily. 
Anti-Communist critics had a field day with the delays, noting 
that even if Canada did achieve some sort of solution, it was 
7 
only opening the door for the entrance  of a dangerous enemy. 
By mid-1970 it did appear that much effort had gone for naught 
in Stockholm. 
In the autumn of that year the Chinese suddenly became 
more receptive  to the Canadian proposals about Taiwan,  and 
the conversations picked up tempo.     After some negotiating 
a compromise was achieved that both sides were pleased to 
announce.     Canada recognized the Communist Chinese Government 
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as the sole Chinese Government,  and in accordance with the 
implication of this statement,  took steps to terminate 
formal relations with the Taiwan Government.     Further, 
Canada agreed to assist the Communist Government in securing 
representation at the United Nations.     On the issue of 
Taiwan,   the Canadian Government "took note of" the Communist 
claims  to Taiwan and recognized the importance of this claim. 
Mitchell Sharpe,   the External Affairs Secretary, expanded 
upon this  point at a later date,  noting that Canada realized 
the Communist claim was significant to them.     In accordance 
with past policy,   the Canadian Government had no comment on 
the future of Taiwan.       Booth Governments agreed to exchange 
representatives,   and almost a year later a full Canadian 
delegation was  in Peking.     In January of 1971 the Canadian 
Government sent an interim charge d'affaires to the Chinese 
Q 
capital,   and in June the Canadian ambassador arrived.      A 
large trade mission,   headed by the Minister of Industry.  Trade 
and Commerce,   Jean-Luc Pepin, visited the CPR in early July 
1971.  and gained much information about commercial relations 
during this five day visit.10    After twenty years of isolation 
the Canadians had made great progress with the Chinese in a 
very short time. 
Though controversy about China was by no measn ended. 
fcr the question of expelling Taiwan from the United Nations 
still provoked debate, Canada did derive a number of advantages 
from this   action.     The country raised its stature in world 
affairs.     It was instrumental in obtaining the eventual seating 
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of a CPR delegation at the United Nations.    The  "Canadian 
formula" was  subsequently used by a number of nations in 
establishing relations with Peking.     The Canadian recognition 
encouraged a relaxation of the American attitude toward China 
— the extent to which the Canadian policy directly or in- 
directly guided  or influenced American policy is an intriguing 
one.     Canadian public  interest was stimulated by the recognition 
and Pepin's  trade mission in 1971-     Indeed,  it is in the 
economic sphere  that Canada probably gained the most.    Though 
there were difficulties in dealing with the Communist Chinese, 
as with any Communist Government, mainland China did represent 
a vast potential market for many Canadian products,  an aspect 
the Canadian Government did not overlook when writing about 
China. 
The accent on trade with China was by no means new to 
Trudeau,   but it received additional impetus after 1968.    While 
the negotiations  for recognition of China were in progress, 
one business   journal noted that the United States concern 
over these talks was probably a facade because the Americans 
would doubtless find it easier to approach the Chinese in 
Ottawa than in Warsaw.11    The Government and the business 
community realized that a Chinese market would almost be 
a private Canadian preserve for some time if Canada obtained 
recognition and  this no doubt accounts for the  jealousy,  and 
the vigor with which the Canadians sought Chinese contracts. 
The Canadian Government gave all the assistance to the business 
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community that it could.    The principal Chinese import and 
export corporations, which are government administered 
bureaucracies were listed in Foreign Txajje. in February 1971, 
one month after the charge d'affaires in the company of a 
"Commercial Counsellor" from Industry, Trade and Commerce, 
reached Peking.     It should be noted that Pepin's delegation 
of eleven Government officials was accomplished by an equal 
12 number of Canadian businessmen.        The interest in trade 
continued to be lively, and some critics caustically viewed 
this commercial tie as the motive for the Canadian overtures 
in the first place.     In response to a query about a Liberal 
failure to diversify Canadian markets, one M.P. rhetorically 
asked his  opponent in the course of his replyi 
Does the Leader of the Opposition suggest seriously 
that Canadian activity in the Pacific realm and in 
Asia has been dedicated merely to cultural exchange 
and archeological studies?13 
Later articles in Foreign Trade provided additional information 
and suggestions for Canadian exporters,  and it is worth 
noting that M.   Pepin,  who did so much to  open this  trade in 
the early  1970's,  became president of a Montreal-based trade 
company after he  lost his Parliamentary seat in the  1972 
election,  and is now doing very well in the commerce. 
Recognising that  the Canadian firms would eventually have to 
compete with Germany,  Japan, and the United States,  the 
Canadian Government worked not only to interest Canadian 
businessmen to become involved while there was time, but 
to obtain as large a portion of the Chinese market as possible 
before competition developed.    In 1972 the Canadians erected 
5^ 
a large display,  known as  the Solo Pair,  in Peking to exhibit 
Canadian products.     This  tactic worked well and secured good 
advances in Canadian sales.    During his 1973 visit Trudeau 
also worked diligently to promote trade.  5    The Liberal 
Government,   true  to long-standing Liberal policy, has taken 
the maximum advantage  of the commercial opportunities made 
available by the course of Canadian foreign policy,   and in 
this instance  by being the first to get a foot in the Chinese 
door. 
Trudeau*s  China policy was certainly not original, 
and he would not pretend that it was.    What was original 
or unique  about it was  that Trudeau,  a man with some interest 
in China, came   to power as circumstances for the first time 
in twenty years  were proper for the implementation of his 
policy for recognizing China.    Even the statesmanship and 
experience  of Lester Pearson had not been met with such 
favorable circumstances.     Domestic  and international pressures 
were no longer  opposed to his course of action.    Trudeau took 
the initiative,   and his representatives skillfully and doggedly 
kept the negotiations alive until a compromise with the CPR 
could be effected.     He realized the impossibility of the two- 
China policy and was willing to break with the Nationalists, 
though he had nc intention of handing them over to the Communists 
and thus setting  an international precedent.     His policy 
worked,   and even his harshest critics had to praise his activ- 
** nn other.16    Beyond this.  Trudeau ities  in this matter,  if no otner. J 
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and his Cabinet saw the economic advantages for Canada,   and 
exploited them.     Canada had a headstart on most western 
nations  because  of the grain trade that she had developed 
in the  late  1960's Granting recognition and exchanging repre- 
sentatives permitted Canadian industry to explore and mark 
out a vast market before competition,  especially from the 
United States,   could develop.     Little time was wasted,  and 
Canada is  still reaping the benefits in terms  of economics 
and prestige. 
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VI.    Conclusion 
Canada's policy toward China in the postwar years was 
a reflection of Canadian policy in general.     The Liberal 
Government of Mackenzie King,   flushed with pride in its 
success during the Second World War, developed the theory 
of the Middle Power,   and St.   Laurent and Pearson were able 
to implement the policy.    Canada was economically and 
militarily stronger than many nations for almost a decade 
after the war and was  thus able to make its presence felt 
and its views known.     There were,  however,  two counteracting 
factors,   one  that was present from the start and a second 
that grew almost unnoticed in the mid-1960's.    The less 
important factor was  the decline of Canadian power and 
influence, relative  to that of other nations in the world 
-- a gradual decline that only slowly came to be perceived 
by Canadian policy makers.     The  other factor was the American 
influence.     Realistic  observers knew that Canada depended 
in large part on the United States for her defense,  and that 
the American economy had a massive influence upon Canadian 
well-being.     While  there was room for some latitude and 
freedom in relations with the United States,   it was considered 
unwise  to directly contradict American plans. 
Canadians had not viewed the Communist takeover in 
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China as an earth-shaking event.     Indeed,  they seriously 
considered granting recognition in 1950,  and would have 
proceeded in that direction had the Korean War not started. 
The desire  to recognize the Chinese was never forgotten 
in Ottawa.     Despite  the Korean War,  some domestic opposition 
to the policy,   and American pressure,  the Liberal Government 
kept the China issue in mind,  even though Pearson and St.  Laurent 
were unable to act.     The ensuing Conservative Government 
strongly disliked the Communists, but it continued relations, 
if for less idealistic motives.     The grain trade grew,  and 
so did commerce  in other items.     Domestic and political 
considerations,   as well as an adamant American position, 
again prevented any real  thought of recognition.     The Pearson 
Government took  a more aggressive stance on Chinese policy, 
and in fact was about to fly in the face of the American line 
in 1966,  when the Great Cultural Revolution all but removed 
China from the international scene.     Pearson's policy was 
in line with the postwar Liberal foreign policy that favored 
an energetic  and active Canadian participation in world 
affairs,   as well as with the rising tide of criticism on the 
part of those who demanded a foreign policy free of American 
influence. 
The internationalist-neutralist debate, suggested earlier, 
is very much manifest in this aspect of Canadian foreign 
relations.     The Liberals under St.   Laurent wished to make 
some accommodation with the Communist Chinese.    Their attempts 
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were thwarted by the events   of the period.    The Korean War 
mobilized segments  of Canadian public opinion and made 
American policy all the more  inflexible.    Diefenbaker and 
the Conservatives  took a neutralist stand of sorts  on China. 
They certainly had no liking for the Communists, but could 
hardly deny  their existence,  especially as  trade grew.    The 
Pearson Government made  the  last big gesture for an inter- 
nationalist policy,  and Pearson was perhaps  the archetype 
of the Canadian internationalist.     As Prime Minister,  he 
seemed determined to take some action on the China issue,  and 
in fact made   overtures  in the United Nations,  as well as public 
statements  to  the  effect that he was preparing to act.     His 
failure  to accomplish anything in this area certainly was 
not his  fault. 
Trudeau  broke with  the  usual Liberal internationalist 
policy in 1968,  for  a number of reasons.    He sensed a 
growing popular discontent with Canadian foreign policy,  and 
he was more  aware  of the  costs  of such a foreign policy than 
Pearson.     Hence he  launched a reassessment,  which brought 
policy more  in line  with Canadian capabilities  and desires, 
and made  it subservient to Canadian national aims.    In this 
respect Trudeau was  a neutralist for he wished Canada to 
participate  in world  affairs,   but only to the extent that 
Canada could realistically contribute and at the same  time 
maintain her  own interests.    For Chinese relations,  then. 
Trudeau came  to power at a fortuitous time,  since he was 
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able to pursue a moderately active and independent policy 
which served Canada and the world.  The extent to which he 
looked after Canadian interests led to criticism that he 
was an isolationist or that he viewed Canadian foreign policy 
in terms of dollars and cents.  In the case of China he 
certainly cannot be called an isolationist, and his defenders 
can justify his emphasis of the economic connection, as 
only taking advantage of a favorable situation. 
Only when domestic, American, and international consid- 
erations point in the same direction, can Canadian foreign 
policy be formulated and executed.  As for the China policy, 
it had both political and economic advantages.  The Conservatives 
found it much to their benefit in the early 1960's and the 
Liberals, especially under Trudeau, were able to please 
left-wing elements at home while keeping the business com- 
munity mollified by increasing sales in China.  Even when 
there was strong, domestic sentiment on the side of a particular 
policy, the American attitude had to be considered.  The 
desire to pursue an independent policy never overshadowed 
this consideration, and even when Canada's overtures to 
China came well before any American initiatives, these over- 
tures were in large part the result of the softening of the 
American position.  Finally, international considerations 
influenced Canadian diplomacy.  The reassessment under Trudeau 
led to a more selective and realistic, if circumscribed, policy. 
The Government seemed more aware of the limits to Canadian 
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participation in world affairs,   less eager to involve Canada 
around the world.     Areas in which Canada had little interest 
or ability to contribute were avoided.     Canada had made a 
first-step in Chinese relations and followed through on it. 
The Government was very careful not to set a bad precedent 
by giving up  on the Taiwan issue,  but at the same time was 
willing to work diligently for a goal that served their 
interests  and  those of others.     Thus, while Canada's policy 
toward China certainly had its unique characteristics,   it 
did typify the course of Canadian foreign relations between 
the Second World War and the 1970's. 
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